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Appellees, FARRELL G. FORSBERG AND VICKI A. FORSBERG, by and 
through their undersigned attorney, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
Rule 3 5 petition the Court for a REHEARING of that portion of this 
Court's decision dated March 13, 1995 pertaining to damages (See 
Exhibit "A11 hereto) . This PETITION is based upon the following 
facts which counsel believes have been overlooked or misapprehended 
by this Court. 
1. This Court's OPINION states: 
The trial court found: 
27. The property, as represented by the 
Defendants, would contain 9,996 sq. ft. 
The actual size of the property is 
approximately 4,628 sq. ft. The fair 
market value of the property, as 
indicated by the Defendants['] own 
testimony, is the sum of $3.85 per sq. 
ft. and the Plaintiff thereby incurred 
damages as a direct and proximate result 
of the Defendants' negligent 
misrepresentation in the sum of 
$21,767.90. 
The trial court seems to have accepted the position 
of the buyers' counsel that buyers thought they 
were receiving a backyard that was 98' x 102'. 
However, there is simply no evidence to support 
this position. Neither party testified that they 
believed the backyard was 98 feet deep. Indeed, 
such a distance would have placed the rear boundary 
of the yard in the parking lot accompanying the 
GMAC building adjacent to buyers' home. (DECISION 
dated March 13, 1995, p. 7) 
2. This Court is incorrect in both observations made in 
support of its vacating the monetary judgment entered by the Trial 
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Court. There JLS evidence the buyers thought the backyard (as 
opposed to building lot) was 98' x 102' and, such a backyard would 
NOT "...extend into the middle of the GMC parking lot." 
3. This Court seems to have accepted, as if it were true, 
the statement made by the Sellers at Trial on examination by their 
own attorney: 
Question: [By KIMBALLS' counsel] Did you ever 
discuss with mr. Forsberg the fact 
that the jbacJcyard extended 98 feet 
or 102 feet beyond where you were 
standing when you were looking at 
it? 
Answer: [By VICTOR M. KIMBALL] I did not. 
Question: Approximately how close to the 
General Motors Building would that 
98 or 102 feet have been? 
Answer: Well, I think it would have been in 
the parking lot of General Motors. 
Question: And approximately how far beyond the 
trees would that have gone? 
Answer: Probably the whole lot size again 
further. (R. 1164, L. 9-22.; 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF p. 15) 
4. The truth is Mr. KIMBALL doesn't know where the boundary 
line is, was, or would be, if extended. The above statement, under 
oath to the Court, is itself a "negligent misrepresentation" - one 
that should not be accepted by this Court and used to mitigate the 
damages of the negligent misrepresentations made by the same 
declarant to the buyers. 
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25. This Court did not obtain from the Clerk's office the 
Exhibits used in this case. It is respectfully requested that the 
Court do so in considering the merits of this PETITION because the 
charts, plats, photos and graphs (specifically Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
Nos. 1, 4, and 35) show conclusively and irrebuttably the gross 
exaggeration of Mr. KIMBALL'S statement uttered at Trial and 
repeated on appeal. KIMBALL would have this Court believe, as he 
urged upon the Trial Court, that the FACT SHEET misrepresentation 
of a backyard 98' x 102' was "unbelievable" because of the enormous 
size of such a lot — one which would consume a portion of the GMAC 
parking lot. From the Exhibits above described Counsel has 
prepared the attached Exhibit "B" to this PETITION using the 
footages described in the courtroom Exhibits, testimony and County 
Plats, all of which conclusively show why the Trial Court did not 
accept Mr. KIMBALL'S testimony and why he believed Dr. and Mrs. 
FORSBERG could have assumed that the poplar trees were in fact 
planted within a 98' x 102' backyard. 
6. KIMBALLS also represented to this Court in their oral 
argument that their BRIEF contained "a complete recitation of the 
testimony and documentary evidence regarding the size of the lot 
[sic]" (APPELLANTS' BRIEF p. 15.) 
7. The above representation to the Court was another 
misrepresentation by KIMBALL. For the Court to assume that there 
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is no additional testimony other than set forth in the APPELLANTS7 
BRIEF is error. KIMBALL deliberately failed to "marshall" the 
following Rebuttal testimony concerning the GMAC parking lot: 
Q [By Mr. Hintze] Do you recall 
directing your attention to P-27, did you 
read the entry there entitled yard size? 
A [By Mr. FORSBERG] Yes, we did. 
Q Mr. Forsberg, let me ask you first: Was 
a consideration of the yard size in any 
way significant in your determination of 
which house to buy, of the many houses 
you were looking at? 
A It was a very critical feature. We 
wanted a home that we could live in 
comfortably inside, but it was very 
important for us to have a yard that 
children, little children could enjoy. 
Vicki had grown up with a backyard that 
was very useable, and the children in her 
family and the neighborhood children had 
spent many hours playing volleyball, 
badminton, basketball, many games. 
I grew up on a farm where we had 
much space, and it was a very critical 
feature to us to have a backyard that 
would be satisfactory for children to 
really enjoy. 
Q Now, I want to draw your — I want you to 
try and go back in your memory, Dr. 
Forsberg, because I realize that since 
this lawsuit has been, filed you have 
prepared numerous exhibits with a tape 
measure in this yard, and today you 
probably have a little better perception 
of distances and feet than you had in 
1987. All right. 
A That would be correct. 
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Q I want you to try and put yourself back 
to 1987. Wh.en you read 98 by 102, and 
then a feet sign, and then "flat 
backyard." what did that convey to you? 
A That number at least suggested that that 
would be a spacious yard. 
Q Have you — or at that time in your life, 
Dr. Forsberg, do you think you could 
stand on a porch and pretty well eyeball 
where 98 feet would be, or 100 feet would 
be? 
A Not very accurately, no. 
Q Do you think you could do that today a 
little better? 
A Probably still not very accurately. I 
could probably ballpark it. 
Q Did you go out in the JbacJcyard and 
observe anything about this particular 
yard. 
A Yes. I remember on that very first visit 
we were in the backyard . we were very 
excited to see a very attractively 
designed home that had a nice view, which 
was also a critical feature. We were 
interested in a yard over a view, but we 
found this home to be very attractive. 
That does have very attractive view of 
the valley, and we were excited to see 
this nice, spacious, flat backyard. and 
we thought such a combination was 
difficult to find, .so we were very 
excited. 
• * * 
Q Now, did you, when you read the words, 
"room for a pool," what did that impress 
upon you, if anything? 
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A That impressed upon me an option and 
impressed upon us that it was a spacious 
backyard where a pool could be installed 
if we wished. A pool was not our first 
consideration in having a home. It's 
something that we considered as an 
option. But as an investor I was 
interested in that as a potential resale 
item. Should we ever have to move and 
sell that property, a prospective buyer 
would be interested in the option of a 
pool, even if we had not installed one. 
Q And as you stood there, Dr. Forsberg, 
could you ascertain in your mind whether 
or not the JbacJcyard was in fact 98 by 102 
as it was flat or the flat portion of it, 
I'm saying. 
A I don't recall trying to make a 
measurement. The lots on either side 
were unfinished lots. there were just 
bare lots that had not been build upon, 
and there was a lot of open space there. 
So it was a very spacious area. 
• * * 
Q And would you tell me what mr. Kimball 
said and what you said, as best you can, 
about the size of the lot? Just direct 
your attention to that subject. 
A The exact wording at this time I can't 
recall, but I do remember a very critical 
issue was the size of the backyard. Had 
the home been an absolutely wonderful 
home but had no backyard^, we would have 
had no interest in that home. 
And I was very interested in making 
sure that the backyard as it appeared was 
actually as spacious as it seemed to be. 
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* * * 
Q And beyond the poplar trees what is 
located in terms of dirt, if any? 
A Beyond, to the west of the poplar trees 
there was dirt, which I assumed had come 
from excavation of the foundation, which 
had been pushed back and was pushed back 
considerably beyond, the poplar trees. 
Q Let's see if you can do any better on 
this than Kimball did. I don't know that 
you can, but the question was asked of 
him" How far is there from the poplar 
trees down to where the GMAC property has 
ended there? Do you follow me? 
A Yes. 
Q There is a space of undeveloped ground, 
is there not? 
A Yes, there is. 
Q Okay. Can you just give us an estimate 
of how far down there is from where the 
dirt steps down to where the GMAC 
property has ended its development? 
A I remember asking — you're asking where 
the dirt ended, or where the poplar 
trees? 
Q Let's start with the poplar trees, then. 
A The dirt extended probably — oh, maybe 
twenty feet beyond to the west of the 
poplar trees, but it was grading down. 
Q It was? Okay. 
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A It was not flat at that point, it was 
grading down. And from the end of the 
dirt that was pushed out to the cement 
retainer wall which borders on the east, 
the General Motors property, I just 
roughly guessed that would be maybe 
another sixty feet. 
Q Sixty? 
A Fifty, sixty, eighty feet. 
Q And in that area there would be no 
development by GMAC that you could 
observe? 
A None that I could see. (R. 1709, 1710, 
1712, 1713, 1714, 1718, 1719, and 1720) 
This Court must presume the Trial Court had properly 
determined the damages based upon the evidence and cannot overturn 
that determination unless it is "clearly erroneous." Gillmor v. 
Gillmor, 745 P. 2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987). For this Court to 
remand based upon the Appellants representation that all of the 
evidence had been "marshalled", and further premise its remand upon 
a gross "misrepresentation" that the size of the originally 
misrepresented backyard would invade the GMAC parking lot -
thereby attesting to the "unreasonableness" of the damages assessed 
- would permit a tort feasor to mitigate his damages by compounding 
his misrepresentations. 
8 
SUMMARY 
For the reasons stated herein the Appellees respectfully 
request a REHEARING of that portion of the Court's OPINION which 
requires a future proceeding before the Trial Court on the issue of 
damages. 
Appellants certifies that this PETITION is presented in good 
faith and is not interposed for the purpose of delay. 
DATED this Z.& day of March, 1995. 
HAROLD A. HINTZ'E ^T <<
<AyC>~' 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
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OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 930418-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 3 , 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Attorneys: Craig G. Adamson, Eric P. Lee, and Cameron S. 
Denning, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Harold A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Burningham & Kimball (sellers) appeal the trial court7s 
finding that they misrepresented the size of the lot in 
connection with a home purchased by Farrell G. and Vicki A. 
Forsberg (buyers).1 Sellers also claim the trial court's award 
1. In their cross-appeal, buyers complained about many defects 
in the construction of the home, urging this court to adopt an 
(continued...) 
of damages is not supported by the evidence. We affirm in part 
and reverse and remand in part. 
FACTS 
Sellers purchased approximately twenty building lots in the 
Benchmark subdivision. To facilitate the lots/ resale, sellers 
built homes on some of the lots, including the home at issue in 
this appeal. Buyers' home is situated in the foothills, facing 
east with the backyard sloping downward to the west. The back of 
the property overlooks a large office building located on 
Foothill Drive known as the MGMACM building. 
During the construction of the home, fill dirt was removed 
from the excavation and placed at the rear of the property, 
covering the survey stakes marking the back corners of the lot. 
After the stakes were covered, sellers had a row of poplar trees 
planted to create a sight barrier between the home and the GMAC 
building. The trees were planted by a landscaper hired by 
sellers and without regard to the actual boundary of the 
property. 
Buyers saw a sign advertising the home for sale and 
contacted their licensed real estate agent, who took them to the 
home, where they inspected the premises. During the visit, 
buyers obtained a "fact sheet" which had been left in the home. 
The sheet was prepared by a real estate agent whom sellers had 
engaged to list the home for sale. When the realtor's listing 
contract expired, sellers blocked out the realtor's name, placed 
their own names on the sheet, removed a statement at the bottom 
of the sheet providing that the information was "[r]eliable but 
not guaranteed," and continued to make the fact sheet available 
to prospective buyers. 
There were no stakes in the backyard or other markers to 
indicate to buyers the rear boundaries of the lot. The fact 
sheet indicated that the "yard size" was 98' x 102', with a "flat 
back yard with room for a pool." The true dimensions of the lot 
are 98.23 feet along the north side, 122.40 feet on the east 
side, 102.38 feet on the south side, and 77.85 feet along the 
west side. The dimension 98' x 102' represents an average of all 
four sides. 
1. (...continued) 
implied warranty of habitability as to the sale of new homes. 
However, prior to oral argument this claim was dismissed pursuant 
to stipulation. We therefore do not reach this issue. 
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Buyers thereafter returned to the home and inspected it with 
seller, Victor M. Kimball (Kimball). On this inspection, the 
parties had a conversation regarding the size of the back yard. 
Buyers indicated that they were interested in a "spacious" 
backyard and inquired what the exact boundaries of the yard were. 
Kimball responded that he was unsure of the boundaries, but 
assured buyers that the row of poplar trees planted at the west 
end of the yard was "within the property line." 
Buyers purchased the home on or about November 17, 1987. 
Several months later, they had the backyard surveyed and learned 
that the row of poplar trees was not within the property line, 
but was three to fifteen feet beyond the property line.1 
At trial, the judge found the combination of the fact sheet, 
the planting of the poplar trees, and Kimball's suggestion that 
the trees were "within" the boundary constituted a negligent 
misrepresentation of the lot size and assessed damages in the 
amount of $21,767.90. Sellers appeal. 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The tort of negligent misrepresentation allows 
a party injured by reasonable reliance upon a 
second party's careless or negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact [to] 
recover damages resulting from that injury 
when the second party had a pecuniary 
interest in the transaction, was in a 
superior position to know the material facts, 
and should have reasonably foreseen that the 
injured party was likely to rely upon the 
fact. 
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 
55, 59 (Utah 1986); accord Jardine v. Brunswick Corp.. 18 Utah 2d 
2. The rear boundary of the lot angles off, therefore the trees 
were three feet beyond the boundary line in some areas and 
fifteen feet in other areas. 
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378, 423 P.2d 659, 661-62 (1967); see also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 552(1) (1976).3 
Sellers claim the trial court erred in finding that they 
negligently misrepresented the size of the lot. A trial court's 
,f[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). 
Although the trial court's findings based on the fact sheet 
are somewhat problematic, the record supports that when buyers 
inquired about the precise boundaries of the backyard, Kimball 
responded that he did not know where the exact corners of the lot 
were, but indicated that the row of poplar trees was within the 
rear boundary of the lot.4 This evidence, by itself, fully 
3. This section states in relevant part: 
(1) One who, in the course of his 
business, profession or employment, or in any 
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary 
interest, supplies false information for the 
guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their 
justifiable reliance upon the information, if 
he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 552(1) (1976). 
4. In relevant part, Forsberg testified, with our emphasis: 
Q: Did you have some discussion with Mr. 
Kimball about those poplar trees? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Tell us what you said and what he 
[Kimball] said, as best you can? 
A: Well, I was trying to confirm the 
boundaries of the backyard, and I asked him 
about the poplar trees. And he related to me 
that the poplar trees were a reflection of 
the backyard, roughly the back west boundary 
of the yard. 
. . . . 
A: He described that the poplar trees-
because there was no landscape markers there, 
I was concerned as to exactly where the back 
(continued...) 
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supports the trial court's findings. Further, sellers had a 
pecuniary interest in the transaction and were presumably in a 
superior position than buyers to know the material facts 
regarding the lot. See Price-Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 59. 
Thus, on the record before us, we cannot say the trial 
court's findings that sellers misrepresented the actual size of 
the lot were clearly erroneous. 
REASONABLE RELIANCE 
Additionally, sellers argue the trial court erred when it 
determined that buyers reasonably relied upon their 
representation regarding the size of the lot.5 
With respect to whether reliance is reasonable, the supreme 
court has stated that one who complains of being injured by a 
false representation 
cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is 
told him, but has the duty of exercising such 
degree of care to protect his own interests 
as would be exercised by an ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person under the 
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to 
account for the consequences of his own 
neglect. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662-63 
(1967) . Sellers assert that if buyers were genuinely concerned 
with the actual size of the lot, they should have obtained an 
4. (...continued) 
corners and back property line were, and he 
assured me that the poplar trees were within 
the property of the residence for sale. 
Both on direct and cross examination, Kimball testified that 
he did not know the exact dimensions of the lot and denied the 
statement that he represented that the row of poplar trees 
reflected the rear boundary of the lot. Although this testimony 
is in conflict, we defer to the fact finder. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). 
5. Specifically, the court found: "The Forsbergs reasonably 
relied upon the representations of the Defendants relative to the 
size of the property. There was no notice whatsoever at the 
closing as to the size of the property ....•• 
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independent survey of the property. Buyers contend that in the 
absence of facts putting them on notice of an alleged 
misrepresentation, they had no duty to investigate. They cite 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), in support of this 
proposition. 
In Duaan, the buyers claimed a real estate agent 
misrepresented the acreage conveyed in a land sales contract. 
The court explained: 
11
 * [A] vendor may be liable in tort for 
misrepresentations as to the area of land 
conveyed, notwithstanding such 
misrepresentations were made without actual 
knowledge of their falsity.' The reason, of 
course, is that the parties to a real estate 
transaction do not deal on equal terms. An 
owner is presumed to know the boundaries of 
his own land . . . . If he does not know the 
correct information, he must find out or 
refrain from making representations to 
unsuspecting strangers. *Even honesty in 
making a mistake is no defense as it is 
incumbent upon the vendor to know the 
facts."1 
Id. at 1246 (quoting Sorenson v. Adams, 571 P.2d 769, 775-76 
(Idaho 1977) (citations omitted)). Further, the court stated, 
"[A] vendee of real property, in the absence of facts putting him 
on notice, has no duty to investigate to determine whether the 
vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed." Id. at 1247 
(emphasis added). 
Here, sellers made a specific representation about the size 
of the yard in the fact sheet. Moreover, they planted a row of 
trees at the rear of the lot to create a barrier between the home 
and the neighboring GMAC building without regard to the rear 
boundary of the lot. Finally, sellers represented that those 
trees were within the rear boundary. Notwithstanding the fact 
that Kimball stated that he did not know the "exact corners" of 
the lot, the trial court found that buyers were not put on notice 
that the lot was smaller than represented by sellers. The trial 
court thus implicitly found that buyers had no duty to 
investigate further the true boundaries of the lot before 
completing the purchase of the home. Based upon the foregoing, 
we cannot say the trial court's finding that buyers' reliance was 
reasonable is clearly erroneous. 
930418-CA 6 
DAMAGES 
Finally, sellers maintain that the trial court miscalculated 
the damages, and therefore erred when it assessed damages in the 
amount of $21,767.90. 
The proper measure of damages in an action for negligent 
misrepresentation is that "necessary to compensate the plaintiff 
for the pecuniary loss to him which the misrepresentation is the 
legal cause." Restatement (Second) of Torts S 552B(1) (1976). 
Such damages may include "the difference between the value of 
what [plaintiff] has received in the transaction and its purchase 
price or other value given," id. § 552B(l)(a), and any "pecuniary 
loss suffered . . . as a consequence of the plaintiff's reliance 
upon the misrepresentation," id. § 552B(1)(b). This court will 
presume a trial court's award of damages to be correct and will 
overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous with no reasonable 
support in the evidence. Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461, 462 
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court found: 
27. The property, as represented by the 
Defendants, would contain 9,996 sg. ft. The 
actual size of the property is approximately 
4,628 sq. ft. The fair market value of the 
property, as indicated by the Defendants['] 
own testimony, is the sum of $3.85 per sq. 
ft. and the Plaintiffs thereby incurred 
damages as a direct and proximate result of 
the Defendants' negligent misrepresentation 
in the sum of $21,767.90. 
The trial court seems to have accepted the position of 
buyers' counsel that buyers thought they were receiving a 
backyard that was 98' x 102'. However, there is simply no 
evidence to support this position. Neither party testified that 
they believed the backyard was 98 feet deep. Indeed, such a 
distance would have placed the rear boundary of the yard in the 
parking lot accompanying the GMAC building adjacent to buyers' 
home. 
The trial court's calculation of damages is not supported by 
the record. Buyers did not discuss with sellers whether the 
backyard extended 98 feet from the foundation of the house. 
Rather, buyers believed the rear boundary of the lot was within 
"a couple of feet" of the row of poplar trees. On cross-
examination, Forsberg testified that the furthest distance 
between the home and the row of trees was 45 feet—a distance 
which he testified he would consider spacious. 
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The proper calculation of damages is the difference in the 
value of the property buyers thought they were receiving and the 
value of the property they actually received. See Restatement, 
suora, § 552B(1). We therefore vacate the award of damages and 
remand for the trial court to determine the difference in value 
between the property buyers thought they were receiving, 
calculated with reference to a boundary "a couple of feet" beyond 
the row of poplar trees and extended in a reasonable manner from 
the marker, and the amount they actually received. 
CONCLUSION 
We r.ffim tho ':iJ.al court's finding that sellers negligently 
misrepresented the size of the lot purchased by buyers. 
Moreover, we hold that the trial court's finding that buyers 
reasonably relied on that misrepresentation was not clearly 
erroneous. Finally, we reverse the damages awarded and remand to 
determine the difference in value between the property buyers 
thought they were receiving and the property they actually 
received. 
''Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
' *k 
Gregory K^tJrme, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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